Reversal of Fortune by Mauricio Cárdenas























Colombia’s annual GDP growth fell to an average of 3% between 1980 and 2000 from 
5% between 1950 and 1980. The sources-of-growth decomposition shows that this 
reversal can be accounted entirely by changes in productivity. Indeed, between 1960 and 
1980 productivity gains increased output per capita by nearly 1% per year. Since 1980, 
productivity losses have reduced output per capita at about the same rate. The time series 
analysis suggests that the implosion of productivity is related to the increase in 
criminality which has diverted capital and labor to unproductive activities. In turn, the 
rise in crime has been the result of rapid expansion in drug-trafficking activities, which 
erupted around 1980. This explanation is supported by cross-country evidence that shows 
that Colombia is clear outlier in terms of conflict and fragmentation, and suggests that 
high crime is associated with low productivity.  
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Colombia has traditionally been regarded as a success story in terms of economic growth 
and stability. According to Figure 1a, this reputation is based on the macroeconomic 
performance between the 1930s and 1970s, which was characterized by increasing GDP 
growth rates combined with a reduction in volatility (measured by the standard deviation 
in growth rates). In fact, GDP growth rose to an annual average of 5.78% during the 
1970s from 3.76% during the 1930s. The standard deviation in the growth rate fell from 
around 3% during the 1930s and 1940s to 1% during the 1960s (and then rose to 1.7% 
during the 1970s in spite of much sharper external shocks relative to previous decades). 
 
These trends are corroborated when the per-capita data is used. As shown in Figure 1b, 
the acceleration in growth was particularly significant during the 1960s and 1970s when 
high GDP growth rates were coupled with lower population growth figures. The 
economics profession, both nationally and internationally, impressed with this 
performance, considered Colombia as a paradigm of macroeconomic management, 
praising the combination of able technocrats and sound institutions as the key driving 
elements of this success story.  
 
As in every other Latin American country, growth decelerated significantly during the 
1980s. Figures 1a and 1b show that very clearly: average GDP growth fell to 3.4% per 
year, while the annual per-capita GDP growth was 1.24%. Even tough both figures 
corresponded to historical lows, macroeconomic performance was perceived as an 
accomplishment at a time when GDP contractions were the norm in Latin America. 
However, relative to its own track record, Colombia’s economic performance during the 
1980s was unimpressive.  
 
Dissatisfaction with the results of the 1980s led to a package of structural reforms during 
the early 1990s. A series of constitutional and legal changes drastically modified the 
regimes related to central banking, trade, foreign exchange, foreign investment, labor, 
social security, and health. The strength of trade reform was impressive: Quantitative 
restrictions were fully dismantled, average import tariffs were lowered to 11.7% in 1992 
from 43.7% in 1989. 
 
Some of these reforms of the early 1990s, especially in relation to fiscal decentralization, 
resulted in an increase in government expenditures. This trend was reinforced by a 
deliberately expansionary fiscal management throughout must of the decade. In fact, the 
central government’s deficit rose to more than 8% of GDP in 1999 from nearly zero in 
1991. This trend was reversed in 2000 when an IMF-endorsed stabilization program was 
implemented.  
 
Unsurprisingly, economic growth during the 1990s was not encouraging, especially 
during the second half of the decade. Average annual GDP growth fell to 2.8% during the 
1990s from 3.4% during the 1980s. In per-capita terms, average annual growth fell to 
0.85% during the 1990s from 1.24% in the 1980s. Growth rates became even more   3 
volatile: The standard deviation in annual growth was 3% during the 1990s, the highest in 
the postwar period. In fact, volatility during the 1990s was twice its value during the 
1980s and 1970s, and three times that of the 1960s.  
 
What explains this reversal of fortune? There are two types of answers in the Colombian 
economic literature. First, a standard macro explanation highlights the role of the debt 
crisis and the reduction in foreign capital during the 1980s and the effects of fiscal 
management during the 1990s (which resulted in high interest rates and an appreciated 
exchange rate). Second, a more structural interpretation that attributes poor economic 
performance to either the effects the implementation of the ‘Washington Consensus’ 
package (especially trade liberalization and central bank independence), or, alternatively, 




This paper searches for an alternative explanation framed in the context of the recent 
growth literature and the cross-national evidence. After analyzing the underlying factors 
that explain economic growth in Colombia it concludes that the growth reversal began 
around 1980, almost a decade before the implementation of the reform package. The 
main conclusion is that low growth since 1980 is the consequence of an implosion in 
productivity explained by the exponential increase in drug-trafficking, violent crime, and 
insurgent activities. The evidence does not support the view that trade liberalization, or 
the lack of additional reforms in areas such as labor market regulation or social security 
(the two more frequently mentioned) can explain such a large reversal of fortune. Rather, 
it is the effect of the ‘fortunes’ generated by drug-trafficking –which have exacerbated 
crime and violence- that explain the change in economic performance in Colombia since 
1980. 
 
In other words, the paper identifies some country-specific and external factors that 
interact with the initial conditions and are able to alter the growth trajectories. As we will 
see, these shocks can induce further changes in the institutions and policies, leading to 
vicious cycles that reinforce the negative effects of the initial shocks. More concretely, I 
favor an interpretation where the increase in drug-trafficking set in motion a chain 
reaction which not only exacerbated crime and conflict (with a consequent negative 
impact on productivity) but possibly also had an adverse effect on the ability to conduct 
more prudent macroeconomic policies. This paper deals only with the direct relationship 
between drug-trafficking, crime, and productivity. The relationship between these factors 
and fiscal policy is an area for future research
3. 
 
The analytical narrative is carried out at three different levels. First, using the standard 
sources-of-growth accounting, the paper presents new evidence on the ‘proximate’ 
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determinants of growth: (a) physical capital deepening; (b) human capital accumulation; 
and (c) productivity growth. As is well known, this decomposition has limitations 
because accumulation and productivity are endogenous factors. As mentioned, most of 
the ‘explanation’ of the reversal of growth in Colombia can be attributed to total factor 
productivity. However, this does not provide a structural interpretation of what caused the 
growth deceleration in Colombia. 
 
Second, the paper analyzes the ‘deep’ or ‘fundamental’ determinants of growth. Recent 
growth studies have focused on the role of physical geography, institutions, and trade in 
determining the long–run performance of individual economies. The main message of 
this literature is that it is extremely likely for a country that is landlocked and close to the 
equator to experience low growth. Things get even worse if it does not have ‘good’ 
institutions, and does not trade much with the rest of the world.  
 
This paper does not engage in the ‘controversy’ of which of these three factors (trade, 
geography, and institutions) is the most relevant for growth. Rather, the paper compares 
Colombia’s record in these three areas with a broad sample of countries. In particular, it 
identifies a series of variables where Colombia is an outlier in the international context 
(e.g., crime, distribution, etc.) and assesses the role that these variables play in 
determining growth in a cross-section of countries. Not surprisingly, the variables in 
which Colombia is an outlier not only are highly relevant for growth but also explain the 
reversal during the 1980s. 
 
The paper is divided in five sections. Section 2 uses a wide range of economic, social, 
and political variables that describe the development process in order to compare 
Colombia with the rest of the world. This section provides some interesting stylized facts 
that characterize Colombia as a country with high levels of crime and income 
concentration, but relatively standard otherwise. Section 3 deals with the time series 
evidence and applies a simple procedure in order to establish the fact that growth in 
Colombia has been lower since 1979. Section 4 presents the standard sources-of-growth 
decomposition in order to quantify the role of physical and human capital accumulation, 
as well as technological change in per-capital GDP growth. The evidence indicates that 
productivity is the key driving force behind the reduction in growth since 1979. Section 5 
relates the high levels of crime and violence, typical of the 1980s and 1990s, with the 
productivity implosion. Section 6 looks into this issue using some cross-country 
regressions. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. COLOMBIA AND THE CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE: SOME FACTS 
 
This section looks at a large number of variables that have been used in the empirical 
growth literature, with the purpose of extracting information on Colombia’s relative 
position vis-à-vis the rest of the world. The information covers a variety of areas, grouped 
into seven categories: Size, Macroeconomic Performance, Trade and Indebtedness, 
Geography and Health, Distribution and Fragmentation, Political Institutions, and   5 
Conflict and Violence. This exercise is useful in order to understand the peculiarities of 
growth and development in Colombia. 
 
For nearly 60 variables that describe the overall process of development, and that have 
been used extensively in the cross-country literature, I compare the value reported for 
Colombia with the mean and standard deviation of a large sample of countries where the 
same information is available. The comparison also includes information on the number 
of observations (in absolute terms and as a percentage of the sample size) with values 
greater than the ones reported for Colombia. This exercise is presented in Table 1.  
 
Size 
Colombia is a relatively large country, both in terms of population and area. In fact, it is 
in the top quintile of the world’s distribution on these two accounts. The rate of 
population growth between 1960 and 1989 was 2.36 on average per year, higher than the 
world’s average (2.01%).  
 
Macroeconomic Performance 
According to World Development Indicators (1997), per capita GDP was US$6,130 in 
1995 (in PPP terms), very close to the world’s average. There were 44 countries (out of 
150) with higher per-capita incomes. Annual per capita growth was 3% between 1960 
and 1975, equal to the world’s average (60 countries –out of 117- had higher growth). 
Between 1975 and 1989 per-capita growth decelerated to 2% per year. Gross investment 
has been on average around 17-18% of GDP for the period 1960-1990, very similar to the 
world’s sample mean and median.  
 
Colombia’s average annual inflation rate was 13.7% between 1960 and 1975. Only 9 
countries (out of 105) had higher inflation rates during that period. Inflation rose to an 
average of 23.9% between 1975 and 1990. However, 17% of the countries in the sample 
showed higher inflation rates during that period. Indeed, the acceleration in inflation after 
1975 was less intense than in the average country.  
 
In sum, Colombia has had a relatively average macroeconomic performance. Growth and 
investment are in line with the sample mean and median. Inflation rates have been 
relatively high (top quintile), but the index of macroeconomic mismanagement (as 
calculated by Rodrik, 1998) is quite standard
4.  
 
Trade and Indebtedness 
Colombia stands as a relatively closed country on all measures of trade intensity. The 
total trade/GDP ratios, regardless of the source and time period, are below the sample 
mean. More than 80% of the total number of countries has had higher trade ratios than 
Colombia. The Sachs-Warner (1995) openness indicator -which is a dummy variable-, 
assigns Colombia a value of zero, indicating that the country is not very open according 
                                                 
4 This is a linear combination of the increase in the rates of inflation and the black market premia for 
foreign currency.   6 
to any one of five criteria
5. However, it is interesting to note that the estimated trade share 
for Colombia, constructed by Frankel and Romer (1999) using a gravity model, is only 
7.5% of GDP, suggesting that structural, and especially geographical factors are the cause 
for the lack of openness. 
 
I also include a measure of external shocks during the 1960s and 1970s obtained from 
Rodrik (1998) who multiplies the standard deviation of the first log-differences of the 
terms of trade with the average share of total trade in GDP. Given the low trade to output 
ratio, the external volatility of the Colombian economy has been modest, compared with 
other countries. In fact, 70 countries (out of 119) experienced greater external shocks 
than Colombia during the 1970s. 
 
Finally, external indebtedness in 1985 was relatively low in terms of GDP (72% of the 
countries with this information had higher debt-to-GDP ratios) and about average in 
terms of exports. This means that Colombia has not been overburdened with foreign debt, 
which has been kept under control.  
 
Geography and Health 
These are two intertwined areas that have shown to be powerful determinants of 
economic growth. The evidence for Colombia indicates that 25% of the population is at 
risk of malaria transmission (29% is the world’s average); life expectancy of the 
population 70 years (64 years is the world’s average); and, infant mortality rate is well 
below the mean and in the bottom half of the world’s distribution. Thus, the data 
underscores relatively favorable health indicators in Colombia in spite of the tropical 
conditions that are described below. 
 
Colombia’s average temperature is 22.5°  (Celsius). The absolute degree of latitude is 
0.04° , indicating that most of the territory is tropical in an ecological sense. Only 16% of 
the land is within 100 km from the seacoast, making Colombia one of the most 
landlocked countries of the world (139 out of 150 countries have a higher proportion of 
the territory close to the seacoast). Moreover, climate conditions along the coast have 
induced the population to live in the inland mountains, explaining why international trade 
has been low, but also why health conditions are better than in many other tropical 
countries. In a sense, Colombia is a good example of the trade-offs involved between 
latitude and altitude: Tropical conditions can be overcome by living in the mountains. 




Distribution and Fragmentation 
This is an area where the relative position of Colombia is not very encouraging. The 
standard measures of distribution of income and land, as well as fragmentation between 
groups of the population place Colombia in the highest levels of income and land 
concentration (regardless of the time period) in the world. In fact, the Gini coefficient for 
                                                 
5 The five criteria are: if it had average tariff rates higher than 40%; if nontariff trade barriers covered more 
than 40% of imports on average; if it had a socialist economic regime; if it had a state monopoly over major 
exports; if the black market premium exceeded 20% during the 1970s or 1980s.   7 
income is 0.51, substantially higher than the world average. The Gini for land 
concentration is 0.86, reflecting the fact that the distribution of assets is highly unequal 
(only 6 countries have a higher coefficient). However, the fragmentation of the 
population is not the result of ethno-linguistic factors. Rather, according to Knack and 




This subsection looks at the quality of the institutions that reflect the prevalence of the 
rule of law, coupled with democratic values. The risk of confiscation and forced 
nationalization of property (obtained from Political Risk Services) has been frequently 
used as a summary variable for institutional quality. The average value for Colombia over 
the period 1985-1995 (obtained from Sachs and McArthur, 2001) measured on a 1 to 10 
scale (higher values imply that expropriation is a less likely event) is 7.39, compared to a 
sample mean of 7.02. Only 46 countries (out of 118) have a lower risk of confiscation 
than Colombia. It has been argued that participatory political regimes deliver higher 
quality growth because democracies yield more predictable and stable growth rates, 
handle adverse shocks much better, and deliver better distributional outcomes (see 
Rodrik, 2000). For these reasons it is useful to measure democracy using the Freedom 
House index of political rights and civil liberties (on a scale of 0 to 1). Here the 
information is again reassuring for Colombia. In the four decades between the 1960s and 
1990s, the value of this index has been over 0.7, higher than the sample mean and in the 
top 40% of the distribution.  
 
However, on other accounts the quality of political institutions in Colombia seems less 
impressive. In fact, the ICRG index (ranging from 0 to 10) based on numerical 
evaluations relating to the rule of law, bureaucratic quality, corruption, expropriation risk, 
and government repudiation of contracts, assigns Colombia a value of 5.30, compared to 
a sample mean of 5.69 (higher values indicate superior institutions)
6. According to this 
index, 49% of the countries have better quality government institutions than Colombia. 
This is probably related to the quality of bureaucratic efficiency and the lack of 
corruption index. These two measures, taken from Mauro (1995), place Colombia in the 
lowest-quality quintile of the distribution. 
 
It is useful to compare three other aspects of the political regime, obtained from Rodrik 
(2000): (a) the degree of institutional (de jure) independence of the executive; (b) the 
degree of operational (de facto) independence of the executive; and (c) the degree to 
which non-elites can access political institutions. These data come originally from the 
Polity III data (see Jaggers and Gurr, 1995), are scaled 0 to 1, and are for the 1970s. The 
conclusion is that there is a high de jure independence of the executive (which is 
characteristic of less democratic societies), but low de facto independence in Colombia. 
Finally, Colombia is in the top quintile in terms of non-elite political participation, a 
positive feature of the democratic system. 
                                                 
6 This index is available in Knack and Keefer, 1995. The raw data comes from the International Country 
Risk Guide assembled by Political Risk Services. I use the average for the period 1980-89, taken from 
Easterly and Levine (1996)    8 
 
In sum, Colombia is a legalistic society, with a long democratic tradition which has 
avoided authoritarian forms of government. However, the bureaucratic efficiency is 
relatively low. 
 
Conflict and Violence 
The last group of variables deals with the measurement of conflict and violence. The war 
variable reflects the well-known existence of an internal armed conflict since the 1960s. 
The homicide rate comes from the U.N. Demographic Yearbooks and shows that 
Colombia had the highest homicide rate (80 per 100,000 inhabitants) among a group of 
84 countries in 1995. In 1985 the rate was much lower (37.4 per 100,000 pop.), but even 




Given its geographical location, large areas of the Colombia territory have relatively 
higher incidence of tropical diseases. Precisely because of that, the population is 
concentrated in the mountains, far from the coast. According to the cross-country 
empirical literature, these two factors should have a negative effect on growth. In spite of 
the recent trade liberalization, Colombia has been relatively closed to foreign trade, 
making economy less vulnerable to external shocks than many other countries during the 
postwar period. Economic performance has been relatively standard. Growth and 
investment are very similar to the world average.  
 
The discussion of Colombia’s institutions is much more complex. While some political 
institutions (specially the ones related to the legal system and democratic principles) do 
relatively well in international comparisons, others such as bureaucratic efficiency and 
the lack of corruption are not well ranked. However, the two areas where Colombia is a 
striking outlier are income and land concentration, on the one hand, and conflict and 
violence, on the other. In these areas, Colombia is one of the worst performers in the 
world.  
 
3. GROWTH REVERSAL: TIME SERIES FACTS 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, Figure 1 suggests a growth deceleration in Colombia 
since 1980. However, the average growth rates per decade do not constitute a proof of the 
existence of a structural break in the growth process. For that purpose I apply a simple 
time series methodology presented in Ben-David and Papell (1997) and use GDP and 
per-capita GDP data for the period 1950-2000, ignoring the lower quality data available 
for the period 1925-1949. As many studies have already demonstrated profusely, it is 
easy to reject the existence of a unit root in both series. Consequently, I test for structural 









Where y is the log of GDP (or, alternatively, per-capita GDP), µ  is a constant, Dt is a 
dummy variable that takes a unitary value if t > TB, where TB is an arbitrary break in the   9 
sample. The coefficient θ  captures the effect of structural changes in economic growth. I 
estimate equation 1 using 30 possible definitions of the variable Dt, corresponding to 
values of TB between 1960 and 1990. For each one of the regressions we test the null 
hypothesis of no structural change in growth (θ  = 0) and compare the t-statistic of all the 
estimated values of θ . The more robust structural change corresponds to the value of TB 
with the maximum t-statistic. I perform the test for GDP growth and per-capita GDP 
growth. In all cases we use 4 autoregressive terms (k=4) based on the Akaike information 
criterion. 
 
According to the results, which are shown in Appendix 1, the more robust and significant 
structural break occurs in 1979, for both GDP and per-capita GDP. During the period 
1980-2000, annual GDP growth has been, on average, 2% below the 1950-1979 average. 
In per-capita terms the reduction of growth has been, on average, 0.9% per year
7. Figure 
2 looks at this issue from a different angle by plotting the difference between growth in 
the period 1950-TB and growth in the period TB-2000. TB is measured in the horizontal 
axis, while the differences in growth are measured in the vertical axis. It is interesting to 
note that 1979 is not only the sample break with the highest statistical significance, but 
also the one resulting in the largest reduction in economic growth. 
 
The conclusion of this section is that, unambiguously, economic growth decelerated in 
Colombia after 1979. On average, annual GDP growth fell to 3% after 1979, from 5% 
before that date. This is a significant alteration in growth path: while it took 14 years to 
double output before 1979, it now takes 23. How is that change explained? What caused 
such a large reduction in growth? These are the questions to which we now turn.  
 
4. PROXIMATE CAUSES OF GROWTH: ACCUMULATION AND PRODUCTIVITY 
 
This section closely follows the framework developed in Hall and Jones (1998) in order 
to estimate the contribution to growth of changes in the capital-output ratio, changes in 
the educational attainment of the population, and changes in productivity. Using the 
simplest Cobb-Douglas approach, assume that output Yt in period t is produced according 
to: 
() ,
1 α α − = t t t t H A K Y  
where Kt denotes the stock of physical capital, Ht is the amount of human capital-
augmented labor used in production, and At is the labor-augmenting measure of 
productivity. Assume that each unit of labor (Lt) has been trained with Et years of 
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According to this specification, the function φ (E) reflects the efficiency of a unit of labor 
with E years of schooling relative to one with no schooling (φ (0) = 0). The derivative 
φ ’(E) measures the effect on efficiency of an additional year of schooling, which 
corresponds to the return to schooling estimated in a Mincerian wage regression.   
                                                 
7 The results do not change significantly when the 1925-2000 data is used. In this case the break occurs in 
1981 for both series. There is evidence of a 1.6 percentage points reduction in GDP growth (0.95 
percentage points in per capita GDP growth) after that year.    10 
 


















where ht is human capital per worker. Taking logs and first-differences: 




















This equation allows us to decompose growth in output per worker into changes in 
physical capital intensity, growth in human capital per worker (educational attainment), 
and growth in productivity. Note that writing the decomposition in terms of the capital-
output ratio rather than the capital-labor ratio facilitates the interpretation because the 
former is proportional to the investment rate (along a balanced growth path).  
 
To proceed with the decomposition we need data on output (GDP), labor input 
(employment), average educational attainment, and physical capital for the 1950-2000 
period. Figure 3 shows the average years of schooling of the urban and rural population 
based on the population censuses and the household surveys
8. It is interesting to note that 
the educational attainment has been increasing at a stable rate since the early 1970s. Even 
though faster progress on this front was made between 1965 and 1973, this is not a likely 
factor in explaining the origin of the growth reversal.  
 
In order to construct the function φ (E) I need the returns to schooling estimated in a 
Mincer equation. Fortunately, Núñez and Sánchez (2000) provide this information, based 
on the quarterly household surveys for the period 1976-1998. According to their results, 
shown in Table 2, the rates of return to education in Colombia do not have the standard 
concavity that has been obtained for other countries. In fact, their returns to education for 
complete secondary schooling (11 years of schooling) are 0.10 for men and 0.16 for 
women. These levels are about the same as the ones observed for five years of schooling, 
corresponding to primary education. Workers with completed higher education have the 
highest returns to education (0.215). Based on this information, I constructed the function 
φ (E), which is depicted in Figure 4. For comparison, I include in Figure 4 a measure of 
φ (E) based on the more standard (i.e. concave) returns to education derived from the 
international evidence surveyed in Psacharopoulos (1994)
9. 
 
                                                 
8 The source is (Estadísticas Históricas de Colombia, Cuadro 7.3 (1954-1996) and calculations from DNP-
DDS for the period 1997-2000. 
9 Specifically, the rate of return for the first four years of education is 13.4%, for the next four years falls to 
10.1%, and to 6.8% for education beyond the 8
th year.   11 
TABLE 2  Returns to Education 
Total  Men  Women 
0-4  0.0853  0.0763  0.0830 
5  0.1214  0.1029  0.1576 
6-10  0.0761  0.0618  0.1021 
11  0.1369  0.1018  0.1595 
12-15  0.1201  0.1238  0.1127 
16+  0.2158  0.2320  0.2026 
Average  0.1020  0.0923  0.1152 
Source: Núñez and Sánchez (2000) 
Years of schooling 
 
 
The capital stock was constructed using the perpetual inventory model and disaggregated 
investment data since 1925. For the year 2000, the stock of capital corresponds to the 
sum of all investment since 1925, net of depreciation
10. Although the methodology 
underestimates the stock of capital for earlier dates, the capital stock is only used for the 
1955-2000 period (due to the limitations with data on years of schooling prior to 1955). 
Thus, in practice at least 30 years of investment data are considered for each observation 
of the stock of capital. Finally, a value of 0.3 is used for the parameter α , which is the 
share of capital in output in the production function.  
 
Before showing the results of the decomposition it is useful to take a cursory look at the 
raw data. Figure 5 plots output per worker against capital per worker for the period 1955-
2000. Interestingly, the pre-1979 period is characterized by a much faster increase in 
output per worker, than in capital per worker, while the opposite is true after 1979. This 
suggests that capital accumulation is not likely to be the cause of the deceleration in 
growth since 1980. Interestingly, Figure 5 also implies that the output per worker 
contraction observed between 1997 and 1999 was not caused by a reduction in capital per 
worker. The fact that with the same amount of capital (per worker) less output (per 
worker) is produced suggests that productivity may be playing a role in explaining these 
changes. This is the issue to which we now turn. 
 
Table 3 shows the results of the decomposition exercise using the two measures of the 
returns to schooling mentioned above. Panel A compares the decomposition results for 
the periods before and after 1979. Annual growth in output per worker fell to 0.66% 
between 1980 and 2000, from 1.55% between 1955 and 1979. The decomposition 
indicates that the reduction in output growth cannot be explained by changes in physical 
and human capital intensity. In fact, changes in physical capital intensity (i.e. in the 
capital-output ratio) have been a positive source of growth during the post-1979 period 
(adding on average 0.64 percentage points to the growth rate per year). The same is true 
for human capital per worker, which has been a steady source of growth given the 
continued progress in average years of schooling. Indeed, during the post-1979 this factor 
                                                 
10 The following depreciation rates were used: 8% for machinery and furniture, 20% for transportation 
equipment, and 2% for housing and construction. The weighted average rate of depreciation was 4.92%.   12 
alone would have accounted for an annual growth in output per worker of 0.96%. This 
means that, other things equal, the educational advancement of the population would 
have resulted in an annual growth in output per worker of nearly 1%. Looking at the role 
of physical and human capital one would have expected higher output growth in the post-
1979 period. This conclusion does not depend on the measurement of the returns to 
education. 
 
Productivity is the key variable driving the results. Clearly, the reversal of growth is also 
a reversal in productivity growth. Before 1979 productivity added 1 percentage point in 
output growth per year. After 1979 it has subtracted about the same amount per year.  
 
The information per decades is also shown in Table 3. The decomposition suggests that 
the contribution of human capital accumulation to economic growth has been relatively 
stable, adding –since the 1960s- around 1 percentage point in per capita output growth 
per year. Again, the main difference between decades is productivity growth, although 
there is an interesting difference between the 1980s and the 1990s. The 1980s were 
characterized by negative productivity growth and low physical capital deepening (the 
two arguments that justified the structural reforms of the early 1990s). In contrast, capital 
intensity increased during the 1990s, in line with the investment boom that resulted from 
trade liberalization, capital inflows, and currency appreciation. However, productivity 
growth collapsed during this period. This result is stronger when Psacharopoulos’ returns 
to education are used. 
 
What explains the productivity implosion since 1979? Is there any relationship between 
the growth reversal and the fact that Colombia has exceptionally high levels of income 
concentration and violence? These are the questions that I try to answer in the next 
sections.  
 
5. EXPLAINING THE PRODUCTIVITY IMPLOSION: THE ROLE OF THE SOCIAL CONFLICT  
 
It is extremely difficult to point towards changes in the political system or in economic 
policies in order to explain the deceleration in economic growth since 1980. On the one 
hand, most legal and constitutional reforms, as well as changes in the institutions that are 
decisive for economic policies, occurred in the early 1990s, almost ten years after the 
decline in growth. Although the economy experienced a negative external shock during 
the early 1980s, mainly due to the end of the coffee boom of the late 1970s and the 
beginning of the debt crisis, it is hard to argue that this sole factor could explain such a 
permanent reversal in growth. Export diversification has made world coffee prices less 
relevant for Colombia, at least from a macroeconomic viewpoint. Also, it is a well-
established fact that the debt crisis was not as severe for Colombia as for other highly-
indebted nations. Therefore, it is necessary to look into other areas in order to find the 
explanation for the productivity implosion. 
 
The emergence as a major illicit drug producer is perhaps the most prominent aspect of 
Colombia’s recent economic and political history. The production of cocaine rose from 
less than 100 tons around 1980, to more than 500 tons in 1999. The area under cultivation   13 
of illicit crops increased to nearly 140,000 hectares in 2000, from less than 20,000 in 
1980, reflecting the substitution of imports of coca paste (the raw material) from Bolivia 
and Peru. A five-fold increase in production and a seven-fold increase in area explain 
why Colombia became in two decades the dominant supplier of cocaine for the world 
market.   
 
The expansion in drug-trafficking activities can be linked to the collapse of productivity, 
mainly through the effect of drug-trafficking on crime and violence. The homicide rate 
(homicides per 100,000 population) increased to 62 on average during the 1990s, from 41 
during the 1980s, 23 during the 1970s, and 19 during the 1960s. The increase in the 
homicide rate, in turn, is related to the increase in the activities of insurgent and 
paramilitary groups.  
 
Figure 6 plots cocaine production (in tons), the homicide rate, and the number of fronts of 
the insurgent groups
11. The strong relationship between these variables has been the 
subject of a number of studies that argue that the extraction of rents from primary goods 
(such as oil and coca) has strengthened the military capacity of the insurgent groups. One 
example is Collier (2000), who points that: 
  
“… economic characteristics – dependence on primary commodity exports, low 
average incomes, slow growth, and large diasporas – are all significant and 
powerful predictors of civil war. Rebellions either have the objective of natural 
resource predation, or are critically dependent upon natural resource predation in 
order to pursue other objectives..” 
 
In the Colombian context, the predatory behavior of the insurgent groups in their regions 
of influence has been documented Rangel (2000). Virtually no one, including the rebels, 
questions the fact that the expansion of the insurgent groups during the 1980s and 1990s 
–both in terms of their ability to recruit and the sophistication of their arms- was based on 
the extraction of rents from the growing coca trade
12.  
 
The relationship between drug-trafficking and overall criminality has been analyzed by 
Gaviria (2000). He argues that expansion of drug-trafficking activities not only had a 
direct impact on crime but also indirectly through the effect on the congestion of the 
judicial system and the consequent reduction in the probability of punishment. Also, the 
change in moral values and the diffusion of crime technologies had a negative effect on 
overall delinquency.  
 
Social capital or social infrastructure is, arguably, the main channel linking crime and 
violence, on the one hand, and productivity on the other
13. Recently, Lederman, Loayza, 
                                                 
11 Although there are differences in size between different insurgent groups, each front is formed of about 
120 rebels.   
12 FARC-EP, the largest rebel organization (with approximately 16,500 members), rationalizes the 
extraction of rents as a tax levied on the small coca growers in exchange for protection. 
13 The term social infrastructure is more precise because it refers to elements that are not really factors of 
production.   14 
and Menéndez (2001) have provided empirical evidence showing a strong negative 
relationship between violent crime and social capital which they define as “...The set of 
rules, norms, obligations, reciprocity, and trust embedded in social relations, social 
structures, and society’s institutional arrangements which enables its members to achieve 
their individual and community objectives...” As they point out, the relationship between 
social capital and crime may run in both directions. The incidence of violent crime may 
diminish social capital, such as trust, or may increase it, through the formation of 
community organizations to fight crime
14. However, the evidence suggests that the 
erosion of social capital is the dominant factor. 
 
The relationship between productivity and social capital or social infrastructure has been 
a recurrent theme in the recent growth literature. In an influential paper, Hall and Jones 
(1999) argue that the lack of social infrastructure encourages predatory behavior. Under 
these circumstances a fraction of the population is employed in unproductive activities, 
either by engaging in crime-related activities or by protecting their human and physical 
assets, making no contribution to output. In addition, some of the physical capital can 
diverted to unproductive activities, such as public and private defense-related equipment. 
This form of diversion is captured in the productivity component of the sources-of-
growth accounting. Similarly, the productivity term captures the contribution of other 
factors of production (e.g., land) that may become unusable when it’s too costly to 
protect them.   
 
From a different angle, social capital, or ‘trust’, decreases the costs of social transactions, 
such as the costs of negotiations, enforcement, etc. In the words of Robison and Siles, as 
quoted by Loayza et al. (2001) “…transaction costs are reduced by increases in social 
capital because each party to the trade has his well-being linked to the well-being of his 
or her trading partner” (1997, 5).   
 
Figure 7 plots total factor productivity (as derived in the previous section) and the 
homicide rate, used as a proxy of criminality
15. Clearly, productivity rose until 1979 
when the homicide rate was relatively low. After 1979, the increase in homicides has 
been matched by a reduction in productivity.  
 
 
Adding income concentration 
 
The reduction in income concentration which was observed during the 1960s and 1970s 
began to reverse during the early 1980s. As shown in Figure 8, in what can be 
characterized as a typical Kuznets Curve, the Gini coefficient increased during the earlier 
                                                 
14 Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer (1999) examine the relationship between social capital and homicide in 
the U.S., while Moser and Holland (1997) and Moser and Shrader (1998) analyze this issue with data for 
Latin America and conclude that “[t]here are often higher levels of participation in community action 
groups in less violent areas”. 
15 Other components of crime show a similar trend. Kidnapping, a pervasive form of criminal behavior, 
have increased to 3,706 in 2000 from only 44 in 1980.   15 
stages of growth (1930-1960), and the fell between 1960 and 1970. The 1980s saw the 
beginning of a new phase with lower growth and higher inequality. 
 
Was greater income concentration also a consequence of the increase in crime and 
violence propelled by drug-trafficking? It is plausible that the interaction of a negative 
shock to crime (associated with drug trafficking) and high initial levels of income 
concentration set in motion a vicious circle of high crime, negative productivity growth, 
low GDP growth, increasing  concentration, with additional negative feedback on crime. 
In contrast, the 1960s and 1970s could be characterized by a virtuous circle of low crime, 
high productivity growth, and decreasing income concentration. However, a full test of 
these hypotheses is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
For the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to say that, regardless of its own 
determinants, the increasing degree of income inequality since 1980 may have had a 
negative impact social infrastructure and productivity.  
 
To check for the effects of crime on productivity I run a basic OLS regression of the log 
of TFP on the log of the homicide rate, controlling for income concentration (using the 
Gini coefficient) as well as for the average GDP growth in Latin America for the period 
1960-1999 (which controls the exogenous shocks common to the region that could 
explain the deceleration in growth). The regression has an Adjusted-R-squared of 0.34 (t-
statistics in parenthesis):  
 
Ln TFPt  = 5.24– 0.04  Ln Homicide Ratet  - 0.99 Ginit + 0.004 GDP growth in LACt +et;    
                (36.12)    (-3.22)                              (-4.42)         (2.54)  
 
Clearly, this regression gives a partial indication of the negative relationship between the 
homicide rate and total factor productivity. Income concentration also has a negative 
impact on productivity. The next section investigates whether this relationship is 
supported by the international evidence, using data for a large cross-section of countries.  
 
6. SOCIAL CONFLICT AND GROWTH: CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE 
 
Recent growth studies have emphasized the role of physical geography, institutions, and 
trade in determining the long–run performance of individual economies. This section 
presents some evidence on the determinants of per-capita GDP and total factor 
productivity for a large sample of countries, highlighting the role of crime and income 
distribution, the two variables that I consider decisive in explaining the reversal of luck in 
Colombia. 
 
According to the geography-driven models of growth, latitude, and more specifically 
prevalence of tropical conditions, act as a constraint to growth. The main reason is that 
technologies are ecologically-specific and that the technologies developed for the 
temperate zones are more productive. Also, technological innovation is an increasing 
returns activity, so the technological gap between tropical and temperate zones has 
widened (see Sachs, 2001).    16 
 
Institutions are receiving increasing attention in the growth literature. A number of papers 
show that property rights, appropriate regulatory structures, quality and independence of 
the judiciary, and bureaucratic capacity are essential pre-conditions and determinants of 
growth. For instance, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2000) argue that weak 
institutions, but not physical geography, explain variations in economic development 
across former colonies.  
 
Integration with the world economy is a third dimension of the development process that 
has been intensively emphasized in the literature as a factor leading to higher levels of 
income. For instance, Frankel and Romer (2000) have shown that countries that trade 
more tend to have higher incomes, even after controlling for the effect of income on 
trade. There is some criticism of this relationship,  because the joint endogeneity (or 
reverse-causation) between trade and income (see Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2000) but the 
evidence is strongly in favor of the idea that geography plays a major role in determining 
trade (using the ‘gravity’ model) and that trade and income are highly correlated.  
 
The starting point of this section the estimation of ‘benchmark’ regression of the cross-
country determinants of economic development of the following form
16: 
 
Ln GDPt = a + b Institutional Qualityt + c Tradet + d Geographyt + et. 
 
The dependent variable is the natural log of real GNP per capita at purchasing parity in 
1995 US dollars, LGNP95, as taken from the World Bank’s 1997 World Development 
Indicators. Alternatively, I also use the productivity level in 1987 (as a fraction of the 
U.S. productivity) measured by Hall and Jones (1998). In either case, I will focus on 
levels rather than growth rates in the cross-country regressions
17.  
 
The proxy for institutions is the risk of confiscation and forced nationalization of 
property, EXPROP, as defined in Section 2. I also use the two variables in which 
Colombia is an outlier, Homicide Rate in 1995 and the Gini coefficient (at different 
points in time), as alternative measures of institutional quality. Regarding the 
geographically-related variables I include the Infant Mortality Rate in 1995, IMR95, as 
reported in Table 1. Of course, joint endogeneity between health indicators and income 
seems plausible. McArthur and Sachs (2001) have shown that cross-country differences 
in health are affected by physical geography (mainly because of disease incidence in 
tropical ecozones). Therefore, IMR95 can be instrumented using the mean annual 
                                                 
16 A new vintage of papers is focusing on the interrelations between these dimensions (and their relative 
strength). Geography, which is the only truly exogenous factor, influences the way in which a country is 
integrated with world markets, regardless of its own policies. Geography also affects institutions. Tropical 
countries have relied on extractive activities that have resulted in rent-distributive institutions (in Colonial 
times and now), rather than institutions that promote local industry (see Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997). 
Trade and institutions also interact: Better institutions foster trade (see Anderson and Mercuiller, 1999) and 
more openness to trade begets higher-quality institutions (Wei, 2000). 
17 The argument is that differences in growth rates across countries are transitory, mainly because of idea 
and technology flows. When the regressions focus on growth, the main purpose is to explain transitory 
differences in growth across countries.   17 
temperature in Celsius, MEANTEMP; the portion of land area within 100 km of the sea 
coast, LT100KM; and the absolute value of latitude, LATABS; all as defined in Table 1.  
 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2000) have noted that EXPROP is likely to be 
endogenous because high-income countries may be better able to protect property rights 
than poor countries. They use a measure of mortality rates from the early 19
th century in 
logs, LMORT, as an instrument for EXPROP. Although, the sample of countries is 
severely reduced when LMORT is used, I also report the regressions that use this variable 
as an instrument. 
 
Table 4 shows the regression results omitting the trade-related variables. Equations 1 and 
2 replicate McArthur and Sachs (2001) and reiterate the point that EXPROP and IMR95 
are powerful explanatory variables. The coefficients are highly significant and the R-
squared is high (0.8). In the specific case of Colombia, the regressions predict a value for 
per capita GNP in 1995 which is between 1% and 4% below the observed level. This 
implies that the level of GNP in Colombia is quite in line with the value that corresponds 
to a country with that level of political institutions (as measured by EXPROP), health, 
and geography.  
 
Equations 3 and 4 add the homicide rate to the list of explanatory variables. In Equation 
3, the coefficient on HOMICIDES95 comes out with a negative sign but insignificantly 
different from zero. In Equation 4, which excludes EXPROP, the effect of 
HOMICIDES95 is negative and significant. Figure 9 shows the partial correlation 
between the log of per capita GDP in 1995 and the homicide rate (controlling or the 
effect of infant mortality). Clearly, there is a negative correlation between income and 
crime. 
 
This Equation does poorly in predicting Colombia’s GDP because its level of income is 
higher than what corresponds to a country with such a high level of criminality. In other 
words, high criminality is a relatively recent phenomenon that has affected growth during 
the last couple of decades. In fact, based on this simplified model, the current levels of 
criminality and infant mortality would predict, in the steady state, a level of income that 
could between 41% and 57% below the level observed in 1995. This means that if crime 
is not reduced, the level of income will fall in the long run to a level consistent with the 
predictions of the model. 
 
Equation 5 adds the Gini coefficient for the 1960s and 1970s. The results do not support 
the view that income concentration has an impact on the level of income once the 
regression controls for infant mortality and its geographical determinants. Equations 6 
and 7 use total factor productivity in 1987 as the dependent variable. In this case, the 
homicides rate does not come out significant, but the Gini coefficient is significant and 
has the expected negative sign. Although productivity in Colombia is also under-
predicted by this model, the error is much lower than in the case of income. Finally, 
Equation 8 uses as dependent variable the change in the growth rate between two periods 
(1975-1990) minus (1960-1975). The results indicate that, regardless of the factors that   18 
explain the change in growth in each country, the higher the initial level of concentration 
the lower the subsequent rate of growth. 
 
Interestingly, inequality and crime are positively correlated (Figure 10). A regression of 
homicides on a constant and the Gini coefficient for 45 countries with data on both 
variables has an R-squared of 0.2 and the coefficient on the Gini is significant and 
positive. This means that there is some interaction between these two variables, which 
creates problems in including them in the same regression.  
 
The next step is to look at the role of trade and geography in a regression that combines 
these two variables following closely Frankel and Romer (1999). They analyze the 
relationship between trade and income by estimating cross-country regression of log 
income per person in 1985 (LY85) on the trade-GDP ratio (TRADE SHARE) and two 
measures of country size (POPULATION and land AREA). The joint endogeneity 
between trade and income is handled by estimating a gravity equation, where bilateral 
trade is regressed on geographical variables (countries’ size, their distance from each 
other, whether they share a common border, and whether they are landlocked). The fitted 
trade values are aggregated across trade partners to construct a measure of trade that then 
is used as an instrument in the regressions. 
 
Equations 1 and 2 in Table 5 replicate Frankel and Romer’s original regressions. The 
conclusion is that the effect of trade on income is positive and significant. In fact, this 
effect is higher when the trade share is adequately instrumented. However, these 
regressions severely under-predict the level of income in Colombia reflecting the fact that 
the trade shares (actual and constructed) were very low in 1985. Again, the implication is 
that the predicted level of income in Colombia, based on trade openness, was below its 
observed value. This suggests that other factors compensated the negative effect on 
income of the lack of trade.  
 
In equations 3 and 4, the original regressions are updated using information for 1995. 
Interestingly, the results become much weaker in the OLS regression, and even vanish in 
the instrumental variables (IV) equation, indicating that the relationship between trade 
and income (at least in this specification) is not robust. From the point of view of 
Colombia, what this tells is that the changes in income cannot be attributed to changes in 





Colombia’s GDP has been growing at an average rate of 3% per year since 1980. In 
contrast, between 1950 and 1980 growth rates were substantially higher and, also, more 
stable. In fact, a 5% growth rate seemed almost natural prior to 1980. This paper analyzes 
the possible causes of such a prolonged change in growth, which has had devastating 
consequences on welfare.  
   19 
There are various possible explanations. Some, argue that the growth reversal is the result 
of trade liberalization (which took place in the early 1990s). Others consider that more 
reforms –e.g., labor deregulation- should be adopted in order to allow trade liberalization 
to deliver high growth.  
 
This paper takes a different approach. It looks at this issue in two steps. First, it deals 
with the proximate causes of growth –the standard sources-of-growth-decomposition- 
and concludes that the reversal of growth is the result of an implosion of productivity. 
This is interesting because it implies that both physical and human capital accumulation 
are not responsible for the reduction in growth. Indeed, this reduction is explained 
entirely by changes in productivity growth. Prior to 1980, productivity gains added 1 
percentage point to the per-capita GDP growth on average per year. Since 1980, 
productivity losses have been subtracting a similar amount. 
 
In the second step, the paper deals with the determinants of productivity, using 
Colombian time series information and international cross-sectional data. The conclusion 
is that the implosion of productivity is directly related to the four-fold increase in 
criminality. The existing literature has already shown that the explosion of crime was the 
result of the rapid expansion of drug-trafficking activities and the intensification of the 
internal armed conflict (fueled by the rents from the drug trade). Thus, the paper argues 
that it is not a coincidence that the implosion of productivity, the increase in crime, the 
expansion of drug-trafficking, and the strengthening of the insurgent movements, 
occurred at the same time, starting around 1980. 
 
The paper also shows that income concentration has tended to increase since 1980, 
partially reversing the impressive reduction in concentration of the 1960s and 1970s. This 
means that growth and equity have moved in the same direction. In fact, the period 
between 1980 and 2000 can be characterized by a vicious circle of high crime, negative 
productivity gains, low growth, and increasing concentration. This contrasts sharply with 
the 1960-1980 period, which can be called the golden age of economic development in 
Colombia, described by the virtuous circle of low crime, high productivity gains, high 
growth, and decreasing concentration.  
 
This paper shows that the reversal of fortune is a direct consequence of the ‘fortunes’ 
associated with the sudden eruption of drug trafficking. Implicit in this analysis is that the 
direct (and positive) effects of drug trafficking on income (on the order of 3% of GDP) 
are of second order when compared to the economy-wide indirect (and negative) effects 
on productivity. 
 
Finally, the international evidence supports the view that high crime and high 
concentration are two interrelated phenomena. Countries with high levels of crime tend to 
show also high levels of income concentration. In turn, high crime and greater inequality 
are associated with low productivity. This may turn out to be more important in 
explaining differences in long term performance than differences in trade orientation.  
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Table 1. 
 
Variable Source Number of 
observations
Size
Total population 1985 (Millions) Penn World Table, Mark 5.6 151
Economically active population 1985 (Millions) Penn World Table, Mark 5.6 150
Average population growth 1960-1989 Penn World Table, Mark 5.6 121
Area (Thousands of Sq. Miles) McNally (1993) 150
Macroeconomic Performance
Income per worker 1985 (International Prices-Dollars) Penn World Table, Mark 5.6 150
Per capita GDP 1995 (PPP) 1997 World Development Indicators 150
Per capita GDP growth rate 1960 - 1975 Rodrik (1998) 117
Per capita GDP growth rate 1975 - 1989 Rodrik (1998) 116
Changes in the per capita GDP growth: (1975-1989) - (1960-1975). Rodrik (1998) 110
Inflation rate 1960 - 1975 1997 World Development Indicators 105
Inflation rate 1975 - 1990 1997 World Development Indicators 131
Change in the inflation rate: (1975-1990) - (1960-1975) 1997 World Development Indicators 105
Investment Rate (%GDP) 1960 - 1975 Penn World Table, Mark 5.6 118
Investment Rate (%GDP) 1975 - 1989 Penn World Table, Mark 5.6 125
Index of macroeconomic mismanagement (inlfation and black market premia) Rodrik (1998) 89
Trade-related variables and Indebtedness
Total Trade / GDP 1960s 1995 World Development Indicators 120
Total Trade / GDP 1970s 1995 World Development Indicators 125
Actual trade share 1985, (Imports+Exports)/GDP Penn World Table, Mark 5.6 150
Actual trade share 1992, (Imports+Exports)/GDP Penn World Table, Mark 5.6 91
Constructed trade share 1985 Frankel and Romer (1999) 150
Sachs-Warner dummy variable for openness (0=closed, 1=open) Sachs and Warner (1995) 83
External Volatility Index 1960s Rodrik (1998) 97
External Volatility Index 1970s Rodrik (1998) 119
Debt-Exports ratio in 1985 Rodrik (1998) 93
Debt-GNP ratio in 1985 Rodrik (1998) 95
Geography and Health
Proportion of a country's population at risk of falciparium malaria transmission in 1994 Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999) 149
Life expectancy at birth in 1995 United Nations (1996) 148
Infant mortality rate (deaths per 1000 live births) in 1995 United Nations (1996) 148
Mean annual temperature in degrees Celsius Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999) 123
Proportion of land area within 100 Km of the sea coast Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999) 150
Absolute value of latitude La Porta et al. (1999) 150
Distribution and Fragmentation
Gini coefficient 1960 - 1970 Deininger and Squire (1996) 58
Gini coefficient 1970 Deininger and Squire (1996) 56
Gini coefficient 1980 Deininger and Squire (1996) 81
Gini Coefficient for Land Alesina and Rodrik (1994) 51
Proportion of the population that does not speak the country's official language at home Easterly and Levine (1996) 127
Index of ethno-linguistic fragmentation (ELF60) Mauro (1995) 109
Racial Tension (1-6, 6 = high tension) Knack and Keefer (1995) 99
 Political Institutions
Risk of confiscation and forced nationalization of property (1-10, 10= no risk) 1985-1995 Political Risk Services. Taken from McArthur and Sachs (2001) 118
Democracy Index (from Freedom House Index of political rights and civil liberties) 1960s  (0-1, 1=full democracy) Rodrik (2000) 98
Democracy Index (from Freedom House Index of political rights and civil liberties) 1970s  (0-1, 1=full democracy) Rodrik (2000) 137
Democracy Index (from Freedom House Index of political rights and civil liberties) 1980s  (0-1, 1=full democracy) Rodrik (2000) 137
Democracy Index (from Freedom House Index of political rights and civil liberties) 1990s  (0-1, 1=full democracy) Rodrik (2000) 138
International Country Risk Guide Index (Average 1980 - 1989) (0-10, 10=high quality) Easterly and Levine (1996) 107
Index of bureaucratic efficiency (1-10, 10 = high quality) Mauro (1995) 68
Lack of corruption index (1-10, 10 = no corruption) Mauro (1995) 68
De Jure Independence of the Excecutive (0-1, 1 =full independence) 1970s Jaggers and Gurr (1995) Polity III data 116
De Facto Independence of the Excecutive (0-1, 1 = full independence) 1970s Jaggers and Gurr (1995) Polity III data 116
Degree to which non-elites can access political institutions 1970-79 (0-1, 1=full access) 1970s Jaggers and Gurr (1995) Polity III data 116
Public expenditure on Social Security / GDP in 1985  Rodrik (1998) 87
 Conflict and Violence
War during the 1960s (dummy) Rodrik (1998) 131
War during the 1970s (dummy) Rodrik (1998) 131
War during the 1980s (dummy) Rodrik (1998) 131
Homicides per 100.000, 1985 Demographic Yearbook, UN, 1988 66
Homicides per 100.000, 1995 Demographic Yearbook, UN, 1997 84
* Number of countries for which the dummy variable takes the value 1  
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Table 1 (Cont.) 
 
Variable Value for Colombia Sample Mean Value for Colombia as
st. deviations from the mean
Size
Total population 1985 (Millions) 28 19% 29.48 31.00 -0.01
Economically active population 1985 (Millions) 32 21% 9.43 14.03 -0.08
Average population growth 1960-1989 50 41% 2.36% 2.01% 0.34
Area (Thousands of Sq. Miles) 23 15% 439.74 332.47 0.11
Macroeconomic Performance
Income per worker 1985 (International Prices-Dollars) 62 41% 9276.00 10658.31 -0.14
Per capita GDP 1995 (PPP) 44 29% 6130.00 6168.39 -0.01
Per capita GDP growth rate 1960 - 1975 60 51% 0.03 0.03 -0.05
Per capita GDP growth rate 1975 - 1989 45 39% 0.02 0.01 0.26
Changes in the per capita GDP growth: (1975-1989) - (1960-1975). 43 39% -0.01 -0.02 0.31
Inflation rate 1960 - 1975 9 9% 13.71% 10.15% 0.20
Inflation rate 1975 - 1990 22 17% 23.90% 48.55% -0.14
Change in the inflation rate: (1975-1990) - (1960-1975) 26 25% 10.20% 40.09% -0.16
Investment Rate (%GDP) 1960 - 1975 55 47% 0.18 0.18 0.00
Investment Rate (%GDP) 1975 - 1989 70 56% 0.17 0.18 -0.12
Index of macroeconomic mismanagement (inlfation and black market premia) 44 49% 0.01 0.01 -0.34
Trade-related variables and Indebtedness
Total Trade / GDP 1960s 94 78% 26.26 53.61 -0.72
Total Trade / GDP 1970s 103 82% 29.53 59.94 -0.84
Actual trade share 1985, (Imports+Exports)/GDP 129 86% 26.33 73.38 -1.02
Actual trade share 1992, (Imports+Exports)/GDP 78 86% 35.36 70.01 -0.70
Constructed trade share 1985 136 91% 7.54 27.20 -0.69
Sachs-Warner dummy variable for openness (0=closed, 1=open) 74 89% 0.00 0.35 -0.73
External Volatility Index 1960s 43 44% 2.90 3.36 -0.16
External Volatility Index 1970s 70 59% 5.12 8.91 -0.45
Debt-Exports ratio in 1985 32 34% 287.50 296.86 -0.03
Debt-GNP ratio in 1985 68 72% 42.85 79.77 -0.60
Geography and Health
Proportion of a country's population at risk of falciparium malaria transmission in 1994 49 33% 0.25 0.29 -0.10
Life expectancy at birth in 1995 56 38% 70.43 64.44 0.52
Infant mortality rate (deaths per 1000 live births) in 1995 82 55% 30.00 48.17 -0.46
Mean annual temperature in degrees Celsius 66 54% 22.50 20.23 0.31
Proportion of land area within 100 Km of the sea coast 86 57% 0.16 0.35 -0.55
Absolute value of latitude 139 93% 0.04 0.30 -1.36
Distribution and Fragmentation
Gini coefficient 1960 - 1970 6 10% 51.61 40.54 1.18
Gini coefficient 1970 5 9% 51.61 40.21 1.25
Gini coefficient 1980 14 17% 51.26 40.55 1.15
Gini Coefficient for Land 5 10% 86.40 67.01 1.25
Proportion of the population that does not speak the country's official language at home 95 75% 5.00 39.35 -0.87
Index of ethno-linguistic fragmentation (ELF60) 90 83% 0.06 0.42 -1.20
Racial Tension (1-6, 6 = high tension) 12 12% 6.00 3.67 1.40
 Political Institutions
Risk of confiscation and forced nationalization of property (1-10, 10= no risk) 1985-1995 46 39% 7.39 7.02 0.20
Democracy Index (from Freedom House Index of political rights and civil liberties) 1960s  (0-1, 1=full democracy) 37 38% 0.70 0.43 0.64
Democracy Index (from Freedom House Index of political rights and civil liberties) 1970s  (0-1, 1=full democracy) 31 23% 0.79 0.48 0.97
Democracy Index (from Freedom House Index of political rights and civil liberties) 1980s  (0-1, 1=full democracy) 43 31% 0.73 0.50 0.68
Democracy Index (from Freedom House Index of political rights and civil liberties) 1990s  (0-1, 1=full democracy) 52 38% 0.77 0.57 0.57
International Country Risk Guide Index (Average 1980 - 1989) (0-10, 10=high quality) 52 49% 5.30 5.69 -0.17
Index of bureaucratic efficiency (1-10, 10 = high quality) 49 72% 5.42 6.63 -0.55
Lack of corruption index (1-10, 10 = no corruption) 53 78% 4.50 6.79 -0.90
De Jure Independence of the Excecutive (0-1, 1 =full independence) 1970s 63 54% 0.75 0.76 -0.05
De Facto Independence of the Excecutive (0-1, 1 = full independence) 1970s 82 71% 0.17 0.58 -1.02
Degree to which non-elites can access political institutions 1970-79 (0-1, 1=full access) 1970s 26 22% 0.75 0.36 0.99
Public expenditure on Social Security / GDP in 1985  39 45% 0.03 0.05 -0.40
 Conflict and Violence
War during the 1960s (dummy) 21 * 16% 1 0.16 2.28
War during the 1970s (dummy) 26 * 20% 0 0.20 -0.50
War during the 1980s (dummy) 34 * 26% 1 0.26 1.68
Homicides per 100.000, 1985 1 2% 37.4 6.00 3.55
Homicides per 100.000, 1995 00 % 8 0 8 . 0 0 6 . 6 8
* Number of countries for which the dummy variable takes the value 1
Number and % of observations
above Colombia in the sample
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Table 3. 
 
Sources of Growth Decomposition
(1)=(2)+(3)+(4) (2) (3) (4)
Growth in:  per-capita Capital-Output Ratio Human Capital Productivity
GDP Ratio per capita
Using Returns to Education from Núñez and Sánchez (2000)
1955-1979 1.55% -0.21% 0.74% 1.01%
1980-2000 0.66% 0.64% 0.96% -0.95%
1955-1959 1.31% 0.27% 0.26% 0.77%
1960-1969 1.31% -0.32% 0.72% 0.91%
1970-1979 1.91% -0.33% 1.02% 1.22%
1980-1989 0.63% 0.39% 1.08% -0.84%
1990-1999 1.12% 1.02% 0.80% -0.71%
Using Returns to Education from Psacharopoulos (1994)
1955-1979 1.55% -0.21% 1.11% 0.64%
1980-2000 0.66% 0.65% 1.03% -1.03%
1955-1959 1.31% 0.27% 0.40% 0.63%
1960-1969 1.31% -0.32% 1.12% 0.50%
1970-1979 1.91% -0.33% 1.46% 0.77%
1980-1989 0.63% 0.39% 0.92% -0.68%
1990-1999 1.12% 1.02% 1.06% -0.97%
Source: Author's calculations.  
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Table 4. Regression Results. 
 
R E G R E S S I O N123456 7 8
Dependent Variable LGNP95 LGNP95 LGNP95 LGNP95 LGNP95 LTFP87 LTFP87 DIF
Estimation IV IV IV IV IV IV IV OLS
CONSTANT 7.67 5.24 7.74 9.99 6.64 0.91 1.48 0.04
t - stat 10.54 4.14 10.22 103.08 10.05 10.33 5.30 2.61
EXPROP 0.22 0.52 0.23 0.29
t - stat 2.95 3.45 3.09 4.56
IMR95 -0.02 -0.012 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.00
t - stat -4.06 -2.11 -3.32 -8.75 -3.99 -2.28 -2.65
HOMICIDES95 -0.004 -0.01 -0.01
t - stat -1.05 -2.13 -0.56
GINI60-70 0.014 -0.02 0.00
t - stat 1.67 -2.36 -3.96
N 118 63 49 50 52 47 72 51
Ad R - sq 0.76 0.79 0.85 0.80 0.83 0.19 0.32 0.23





LMORT !  
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Table 5. Regression Results. 
 
R E G R E S S I O N 1234
DEPENDENT VARIABLE LY85* LY85* LGNP95** LGNP95**
Estimation OLS IV OLS IV
CONSTANT 8.14 6.88 6.59 -5.63
t - stat 24.50 6.56 5.18 -0.42
TRADE SHARE 0.85 1.97 0.01 0.05
t - stat 3.48 2.16 2.14 1.06
Ln POPULATION 0.12 0.20 0.15 0.35
t - stat 1.89 2.18 1.51 1.23
Ln AREA -0.013 0.09 -0.01 0.59
t - stat (-0,24) 0.88 -0.06 0.89
N1 5 0 1 5 0 8 3 8 3
Ad R-sq 0.08 -                 0.04 -                




Constructed Trade Share*** !!
* Actual Trade Share, Population, and Area are for 1985.
** Actual Trade Share, Population, and Area are for 1995 and come from the World Penn Tables Mark 5.6.
*** Constructed trade share comes from Frankel and Romer (1999) for 1985, and from Andrew Rose's Website for 1995.   
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Figure 1a. 
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Average Growth  Standard Deviation
Source: Author's calculations based on National Accounts data from DANE.  
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Figure 1b. 
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Average Growth  Standard Deviation
Source: Author's calculations based on National Accounts data from DANE.  









































Source: Author's calculations based on National Accounts data from DANE.
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Figure 3. 
 
Average Years of Schooling








































































































Source: Estadísticas Históricas de Colombia, Cuadro 7.3 (1954-1996) and calculations from DNP-DDS for the period 1997-2000.  
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Figure 6. 
 
















































































































Source: Homicide Rate comes from Informes de Criminalidad (Policia Nacional) various years. Cocaine production and exports from Rocha (2000)
Guerrilla Fronts
homicide rate
Cocaine Production in Tons
Cocaine Exports in Tons
 
 










































































































































Source: 1938, 1951, 1964 and 1971, "Distribución del Ingreso y Desarrollo Económico", Juan Luis Londoño. 
                 1976-2000, Dane, Encuesta Nacional de Hogares.  Cálculos DNP-Umacro.
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Figure 8. 
 































































































Source: Author's calculation (TFP) and Informes de Criminalidad, Policia Nacional 
 






















































































Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   Year     Akaike IC
D60 -0.00233 0.00737 -0.31612 0.75340 1960 -4.81929
D61 -0.00112 0.00713 -0.15721 0.87580 1961 -4.81762
D62 -0.00068 0.00687 -0.09866 0.92190 1962 -4.81729
D63 -0.00077 0.00665 -0.11561 0.90850 1963 -4.81737
D64 0.00015 0.00652 0.02219 0.98240 1964 -4.81708
D65 -0.00178 0.00635 -0.27980 0.78090 1965 -4.81881
D66 -0.00142 0.00626 -0.22729 0.82120 1966 -4.81822
D67 -0.00200 0.00616 -0.32371 0.74770 1967 -4.81940
D68 -0.00136 0.00607 -0.22410 0.82370 1968 -4.81819
D69 -0.00318 0.00599 -0.53067 0.59830 1969 -4.82331
D70 -0.00417 0.00594 -0.70322 0.48550 1970 -4.82800
D71 -0.00591 0.00589 -1.00408 0.32070 1971 -4.83923
D72 -0.00646 0.00589 -1.09793 0.27810 1972 -4.84351
D73 -0.00934 0.00584 -1.59977 0.11660 1973 -4.87239
D74 -0.01137 0.00588 -1.93482 0.05930 1974 -4.89698
D75 -0.01306 0.00599 -2.18029 0.03450 1975 -4.91749
D76 -0.01134 0.00628 -1.80462 0.07780 1976 -4.88694
D77 -0.01416 0.00629 -2.25255 0.02920 1977 -4.92391
D78 -0.01539 0.00633 -2.43078 0.01910 1978 -4.94044
D79 -0.01992 0.00608 -3.27670 0.00200 1979 -5.03105
D80 -0.01964 0.00624 -3.14915 0.00290 1980 -5.01624
D81 -0.02008 0.00650 -3.08821 0.00340 1981 -5.00929
D82 -0.01864 0.00685 -2.72110 0.00920 1982 -4.96940
D83 -0.01759 0.00710 -2.47669 0.01710 1983 -4.94486
D84 -0.01614 0.00703 -2.29403 0.02650 1984 -4.92767
D85 -0.01504 0.00686 -2.19283 0.03350 1985 -4.91860
D86 -0.01286 0.00676 -1.90271 0.06350 1986 -4.89445
D87 -0.01415 0.00661 -2.14054 0.03780 1987 -4.91404
D88 -0.01447 0.00674 -2.14665 0.03720 1988 -4.91457
D89 -0.01400 0.00701 -1.99718 0.05190 1989 -4.90200
D90 -0.01296 0.00732 -1.76927 0.08360 1990 -4.88432
Source: Author's calculations.  




Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   Year     Akaike IC
D60 0.00181 0.00676 0.26812 0.78980 1960 -4.97766
D61 0.00381 0.00657 0.57990 0.56490 1961 -4.98351
D62 0.00459 0.00636 0.72262 0.47370 1962 -4.98760
D63 0.00475 0.00615 0.77271 0.44370 1963 -4.98925
D64 0.00573 0.00599 0.95627 0.34400 1964 -4.99618
D65 0.00401 0.00589 0.68102 0.49930 1965 -4.98632
D66 0.00471 0.00579 0.81355 0.42020 1966 -4.99067
D67 0.00434 0.00572 0.75879 0.45190 1967 -4.98878
D68 0.00530 0.00563 0.94144 0.35150 1968 -4.99557
D69 0.00363 0.00559 0.64849 0.52000 1969 -4.98537
D70 0.00295 0.00556 0.53027 0.59850 1970 -4.98229
D71 0.00138 0.00554 0.24912 0.80440 1971 -4.97744
D72 0.00102 0.00550 0.18581 0.85340 1972 -4.97683
D73 -0.00168 0.00543 -0.30866 0.75900 1973 -4.97818
D74 -0.00320 0.00540 -0.59161 0.55710 1974 -4.98381
D75 -0.00422 0.00539 -0.78132 0.43870 1975 -4.98954
D76 -0.00300 0.00543 -0.55322 0.58290 1976 -4.98284
D77 -0.00462 0.00540 -0.85519 0.39700 1977 -4.99219
D78 -0.00564 0.00540 -1.04452 0.30180 1978 -5.00002
D79 -0.00939 0.00532 -1.76376 0.08460 1979 -5.04291
D80 -0.00932 0.00545 -1.71108 0.09400 1980 -5.03910
D81 -0.00946 0.00557 -1.69789 0.09640 1981 -5.03816
D82 -0.00854 0.00572 -1.49356 0.14230 1982 -5.02445
D83 -0.00813 0.00584 -1.39200 0.17080 1983 -5.01822
D84 -0.00679 0.00589 -1.15348 0.25480 1984 -5.00520
D85 -0.00689 0.00587 -1.17466 0.24630 1985 -5.00627
D86 -0.00575 0.00591 -0.97286 0.33580 1986 -4.99688
D87 -0.00723 0.00595 -1.21474 0.23080 1987 -5.00833
D88 -0.00734 0.00614 -1.19584 0.23800 1988 -5.00735
D89 -0.00719 0.00637 -1.12808 0.26530 1989 -5.00395
D90 -0.00655 0.00660 -0.99206 0.32650 1990 -4.99770
Source: Author's calculations.  
 
 